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Economic Interventionism, Armament Industries and the Keynesian Theory  
The economists debates in France and Great Britain, 1936-1940 
 
Fanny Coulomb* & Alain Alcouffe** 
 
Summary: The “military keynesianism” can hardly claim to be representative of Keynes’ thought. However, the 
arms sector was one of the first to benefit from large public expenditures during the interwar period. This paper aims 
to present the debate among economists on the rearmament issue during the second half of the 1930s. 
 
 The relationship between Keynes and the economy of war is rather paradoxical. On the one 
hand, Keynes played a significant role in his country's war effort during the two world conflicts, 
and acknowledged the stimulus effect. induced by European rearmament, on the other hand, his 
inclination towards different dimensions of pacifism has manifested itself on many occasions in 
his life, as in the conclusion of the General Theory, which ends with the hope that the reforms of 
the capitalism it proposes will lead to a world without war. 
The expression "military keynesianism", widely used during the US-Soviet arms race, contributed 
to the suspicion of Keynes's sympathy for rearmament or war as a privileged instrument of 
recovery, and even for authoritarian regimes. His hostility to commercial liberalism in times of 
crisis has also fostered the image of a Keynes supporter of economic nationalism, the latter having 
often gone hand in hand with the praise of militarism, as illustrated by the case of Friedrich List, 
in his National System of Political Economy (1840). 
An analysis of Keynes' contribution to the economic debate related to British rearmament, 
however, qualifies this analysis. It is interesting to put in the reactions of economists to rearmament 
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policies on both sides of the Channel. Do Keynesian ideas permeate the public debate on the rise 
in military spending and the eventual nationalization of arms-producing industries? 
 
Over the period, the economic situation is very different between the two countries. In France, 
after an episode of deflation under the Laval government, the Franc was devalued in October 1936 
by the government of the Popular Front of Leon Blum. It is a question of trying to start an 
economic recovery, whereas in 1935 the French economy is in crisis (the lowest GDP of the period 
1929-1938, the unemployment rate at 14.5%, widening of the deficit budget despite austerity and 
soaring public debt, at 200% of GDP)1. While in most industrialized countries, the recovery is at 
the beginning of 1936, France is unable to return to growth and export competitiveness. The 
industrial sectors supplying the army with equipment are not very efficient, notably the aeronautical 
industry, which suffers from numerous structural problems. To counter this economic slump, the 
Popular Front government took many initiatives between June and September 1936, including the 
launch of a program of major works and a rearmament program (14 billion over four years)2, as 
well as the nationalization of war industries. 
The effectiveness of these measures on arms production will be limited, at least initially, because 
the government must indeed face major strikes, especially in the metallurgical industry, which is 
essential to weapons production3. On the other hand, the hostility of the business community to 
the Popular Front limits productive investment, which has already been considerably reduced since 
1931. 
It was not until the summer of 1938 that the economic recovery seemed to be confirmed, partly 
driven by the rearmament policy. The French economic policy remains over the period marked by 
liberal orthodoxy and the proposal of Leon Blum in 1938 to introduce a control of the capital at 
the same time as the military expenses would be increased is rejected. In April 1938, the new 
president of the Council, Edouard Daladier, announces a doubling of the military budget, at the 
same time that the social expenses are considerably reduced by the Minister of Finance, Paul 
Reynaud.  
                                                          
1 Dockès P. (2017), op.cit., Dockès P. (2017), La grande crise des années 1930, in Le Capitalisme et ses rythmes, quatre 
siècles en perspective. Tome 1, Sous le regard des géants, Classiques Garnier, pp.521-642. 
2 Dockès P. (2017), op.cit., p. 639. 
3 Vidal G. (2004), « Le Parti communiste français et la défense nationale (septembre 1937 septembre 1939) », Revue 
Historique, 2. 
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« Reynaud hoped that rearmament could be financed through the revenue of savings bonds. As long as confidence in 
the French economy could be maintained, the willingness of French savers to support the state would allow rearmament 
without inflation. But, as in Germany, even if the domestic balance could be preserved, the foreign account posed a 
constant challenge. How was France with its national economy devoted increasingly to armaments to pay for imports, 
above all of American aircraft? By the summer of 1939, with armaments spending surging ahead of revenue, the 
French state was without a coherent strategy: it had neither the money to pay for, nor the institutional mechanisms 
to coordinate, the industrial production needed to fight and win the coming European war. »4 
 
In Great Britain, the situation is quite different, with an economic recovery at the end of 1936 that 
fuels fears that inflation would rise again. A rearmament program was initiated by the British 
Government in February 1936, as traced in an article of the Guardian in March, 1935:  
« In a major reversal of rearmament policy Britain today announced new expansion plans for its army, navy and air 
force. The plans, in a defence white paper, are to demonstrate that Britain does not take lightly Germany's continuing 
rearmament. The white paper calls for an enlarged fleet, improved defences for warships against air attack, more 
aircraft for the RAF and new coastal and anti-aircraft defences. The emphasis on air defence follows fears that 
Britain is an easy target for cross-Channel air raids. »5 
The rise in military expenditure will subsequently accelerate. The cost of rearmament is estimated 
at 1500 million pounds for the period 1937/8 - 1941/2, 1100 of which should be financed by 
taxation. It remains to borrow £ 400m. In February 1939, this sum is revalued to £ 800 million for 
the 5 years considered but in reality the loans will quickly exceed this amount, voluntarily 
underestimated so as not to scare the markets. 
In Great Britain, the debate on the economic and financial consequences of these loans is very 
advanced. The fear of increased inflation if borrowing exceeds the country's savings capacity is put 
forward by Hawtrey; Philips meanwhile considers that there is no risk. But a problem is also that 
of the decline in the gold stock following the deterioration of the current account and the 
weakening of the pound sterling. The question of trade restrictions (tariffs and quotas) is thus 
important, and Keynes advocates a restriction of imports6.  
                                                          
4 Geyer M., Tooze A. (2015), The Cambridge History of the Second World War: Volume 3, Total War: Economy, Society and 
Culture, Cambridge University Press, pp. 38-39. 
5 The Guardian, Monday 4 March 1935. 
6 Peden J.C. (2004), Keynes and his critics, OUP, British Academy. 
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As in France, though to a lesser extent, defense companies are struggling to honor the military 
orders, particularly of the Royal Air Force and of the army. The Air Ministry will intervene to 
regulate the military aeronautical production, without however nationalizing the companies in 
question. 
 
Our article aims to question the reactions and analyzes of French and British economists 
to the increased state interventionism in the armaments sector from the second half of the 1930s 
(I); we will then show how the possibility of an economic revival through rearmament is analyzed 
by economists, and in the first place by J.M. Keynes (II). 
 
I - The debate on State intervention in the armaments sector 
 
 The nationalization of armaments industries decided by the Popular Front incurred the wrath 
of the French liberals, this measure being considered worthy of a totalitarian, communist or fascist 
regime. But the debate remains weak in France. It is the analysis of Ludwig Von Mises that will 
remain emblematic of the liberal position on this issue. Gradually however, in the face of 
deficiencies in the supply of war materials, the idea of a necessary regulation by the state is making 
its way. 
 
A) Economists’ reactions towards nationalizations in the French armament sector  
 
The question of an insufficient rearmament of France during the 1930s, which would have 
been responsible for the defeat of 1940, was widely debated. Has the nationalization of the 
manufacture of war materials (Act of August 11, 1936), which was one of the first measures taken 
by the Popular Front government, served the military production? This subject was only weakly 
discussed at the time, which can be explained by the very small scale of nationalization. Garraud 
recalls that of the 70,000 companies working for the defense in 1936, only 7 are nationalized, for a 
total of about 10,000 workers7.  
                                                          
7 Garraud Philippe (2005), « La politique française de réarmement de 1936 à 1940 », Guerres mondiales et conflits 
contemporains, n° 219, 3.  
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It is mainly companies in the land armament sector that are concerned. These measures will receive 
the support of the French Communist Party and will provoke the hostility of employers and some 
liberal economists. 
 
1) The debate in the French Senate in August 1936 
 
The debate in the Senate of August 7, 1936, on the nationalization of war material is illustrative of 
the fears of some politicians as to the negative consequences of these nationalizations, according 
to two main arguments8 :  
- The risk of a peacetime burden of maintaining State control of unused production capacity for 
war materials; 
- The decline in the overall level of French arms production, due to the lack of private capital, in a 
context of fiscal austerity. 
 
In support of this thesis, an anonymous article of the Revue de Paris of November 1936 reports 
the conclusions of a commission set up by the British Government, which favors the maintenance 
of the private arms industry and not the creation of a state monopoly. The author of the article 
concludes: 
«The nationalization of aviation is therefore in no way a military or public interest. It bears exclusively the mark of 
political preoccupations hiding behind national pretexts. It will constitute a considerable advance in the socialization 
of the country at the same time as an indisputable lowering of its military power and its creative force.»9 
 
In 1937, the economy Edmond Giscard d'Estaing also criticizes this initiative: « It is hoped that one 
day the country will know what it costs the economic absurdity of the nationalization of national defense industries 
and will know the details of this incredible adventure. The proof is that nationalizations require a lot of money and 
have never paid for it.»10 
                                                          
8 See for example the arguments of Mr. Henri Lemery during a debate in the Senate : Matériels de guerre : 
nationalisation de leur fabrication, Journal Officiel, Sénat, séance du 7 août 1936, p. 1098. 
9 Anonyme (1936), “Quand l’Etat nationalise”, La Revue de Paris, novembre, p. 423. « La nationalisation de l'aviation 
ne se présente donc à aucun degré comme une entreprise d'intérêt militaire ou d'intérêt public. Elle porte 
exclusivement la marque de préoccupations politiques qui s'abritent derrière des prétextes nationaux. Elle constituera 
-un progrès considérable dans la socialisation du pays en même temps qu'un abaissement incontestable de sa 
puissance militaire et de sa force créatrice. » 
10 E. Giscard d’Estaing (1937), « Moyens de Trésorerie », in La Revue de Paris, 1er juin, p. 537. « Il faut espérer qu'un 
jour le pays saura ce que lui coûte l'absurdité économique de la nationalisation des industries de défense nationale et 
connaîtra les détails de cette inénarrable aventure. La preuve est faite que les nationalisations exigent beaucoup d'argent 
et qu'elles n'en n'ont jamais rapporté. » 
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Three months later, he points to the weakness of French military aeronautics production and 
blames the social policy of the Popular Front, as well as the nationalization of arms companies. For 
him, nationalization is only one aspect among others of the disastrous management of public affairs 
by the government.  
« In July 1937, 40 aircrafts were delivered to the Air Force (instead of the 120 that would be needed). In August 
1937, delivery fell to 32 aircraft. The weakness of this production is already evident in absolute value when compared 
to the French needs. It is even more so in relative value if we know that the production of appliances of the same order 
is currently in Italy at 150 per month and that actual deliveries in Germany reach, and perhaps exceed, 300 per 
month. month. This precise example draws in the most complete way what can be said about the current French 
crisis. The causes are many: slower hourly output, fewer hours of work, general disorganization of production, labor 
disputes, sovietization of some factories, difficulty of supply, rising cost prices, on which is broached the nationalization 
of the war industries which has dealt a terrible blow to one of the essential means of our national defense. This 
complex of errors leads to the brutal fact of the number of devices delivered in one month. »11 
 
 For defenders of nationalization, on the other hand, the example of the naval industry shows 
that a military production under state control can make it possible to reach very satisfactory 
objectives12. In fact, René La Bruyère recalls in July in the Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires 
that there can be no nationalization of the naval industry, since it is already effective.13 
 
 In Great Britain, the Labor Party's position on the nationalization of the armaments industry 
evolves between 1934 and 1935. The goal of nationalization is included in the 1934 program, For 
Socialism and Peace, but in 1935, « Arthur Henderson, in an official statement of Labour’s foreign policy, said 
the Labour would propose to the League of Nations a plan which would include ‘the nationalization and drastic 
international control of the manufacture of and trade in arms’.» 14 
 
 
2) The criticism by Ludwig Von Mises of the French nationalization 
                                                          
11 E. Giscard d’Estaing (1937), « L’anémie économique », in La Revue de Paris,15 octobre, p. 813. 
12 Voir les arguments de M. Daniel Vincent, président de la Commission de l’armée, lors de ce même débat (cf. op. 
cit. p. 1100, arguments approuvés lors de ce débat par Edouard Daladier, ministre de la Défense nationale et de la 
guerre et par Joseph Caillaux, président de la Commission des finances. 
13 La Bruyère René (1936), « Il ne saurait y avoir de nationalisation pour la construction navale elle est déjà faite », 
Journal des débats politiques et militaires, 17 juillet, p. 1. 
14 Millward R., Singleton J. (1995), The Political Economy of Nationalisation in Britain, 1920-1950, Cambridge University 
Press, p. 171. 
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 The question of whether it is better to leave production under private control or to nationalize 
it was subsequently discussed by Von Mises in chapter VI of his work written in 1940, 
Interventionism, an economic analysis, entitled « War economy »15.  
« It is apparent that in the final analysis war and the market economy are incompatible. The market economy could 
only develop because industrialism had pushed militarism into the background and because it made the total war 
"degenerate" into the soldiers' war. » (p. 70) 
For Von Mises, the directed production of totalitarian regimes that concentrate a lot of resources 
on arms production, such as Nazi Germany, are generally considered more effective at achieving 
military superiority than the free market economy, civilian production being kept to a minimum. 
However, according to him, the insufficient armament production of the market economies in the 
1930s can be explained firstly by the combined influence of antifascists (Labor in Great Britain and 
Leon Blum in France: they opposed a large-scale rearmament, considering that it was the game of 
the fascists) and anticommunists (who did not believe in the will of the Nazis to annihilate the 
French and British empires and to dominate Europe). Thus for the Austrian economist, it is not 
capitalism that is to blame for the insufficient defense of the French Eastern Frontier but the 
political opposition to rearmament, especially on the suspicion of collusion between major arms 
manufacturers and the military, all finding an economic interest in total war. According to Von 
Mises, it is this mistaken view that led to the nationalization of the arms industries by Leon Blum, 
which nationalization has considerably limited the productive potential of France in terms of 
military equipment. And French pacifism prevented an accelerated rearmament between the 
outbreak of the war and the spring of 1940, rearmament that would no doubt have been sufficient 
to meet the needs of the French army in military equipment.  
«On the basis of such reasoning the Blum government nationalized the French armament industry. When the war 
broke out and it became imperative to place the productive power of all French plants into the service of the rearmament 
effort, the French authorities considered it more important to block war profits than to win the war. From September 
1939 until June 1940, France in actuality did not fight the war against the Nazis, but in fact it fought a war 
against war profiteering. In this one respect, they were successful.» (page 72) 
On the other hand, during WWI, private entrepreneurship proved to be a very efficient system for 
the supply of military equipment.  
«At no other time has the efficiency and productive capacity of the entrepreneurs been proved more effectively than 
during the first World War. It is only envy and unthinking resentment that cause people to fight against the profits 
                                                          
15 Mises Von L. (1940), Interventionism, an economic analysis, edited by Bettina Bein Greaves, Foundation for Economic 
Education, 1998. 
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of the entrepreneurs, whose efficiency makes possible the winning of the war. When the capitalist nations in time of 
war give up the industrial superiority which their economic system provides them, their power to resist and their 
chances to win are considerably reduced.» (page 73).  
For Von Mises, interventionism (including in particular the nationalization of arms production in 
France) could only lead to insufficient defense production and military failure, because this 
interventionism destroys the possibilities of profit (which will be taxed), even though the 
profitability of armaments production remains uncertain, dependent on political developments 
(and in particular whether or not a continuation of the conflict). Incentives for investment and 
entrepreneurship are thus considerably reduced in an interventionist system, and the level of 
production of war materials remains much lower than it would have been if this production had 
been maintained free. 
«In war, too, there is only the choice between the market economy and socialism. The third alternative, interventionism, 
is not even possible in war.» (p. 74) 
«The defeat of France and the destruction of English cities was the first price paid for the interventionist suppression 
of war profits.» (p. 75) 
 
B) Towards an acceptance of state regulation of arms production 
 
 In the late 1930s, many French politicians and analysts seem to agree on the inevitability of the 
State taking control of the production of war materials, for national security imperatives. The idea 
of a « total war» in which the quantity and quality of armaments are decisive factors, much more 
than the number of troops, and requiring the mobilization of the national industrial complex, is 
quite common since the end of the first world war. 
However, the economic analyzes of the production of armaments under state control are few and 
limited. In France, the nationalization of the manufacture of war materials in 1936 does not give 
rise to significant economic analysis. In the Revue d’Economie Politique from 1936 to 1940, there are 
no specific studies on the nationalization of the arms industry or the impact of rearmament. It is 
international monetary issues that are widely debated in economic journals. Thus the Journal des 
Economistes reports on an economic meeting in Antwerp organized in July 1936, which brought 
together economists from several countries, including J.M. Keynes for Great Britain and M. 
Nogaro for France. 
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« It is on the monetary question that the conflict has erupted between the partisans of directed money and cheap credit, 
on the one hand, and the proponents of general and immediate stabilization, on the other. It is the eternal conflict 
between the interventionists and the proponents of the classical economy.»16  
French economists of course placed themselves on the side of the proponents of a «fixed and 
independent currency». 
 
 
 However, we can note an original analysis relating to our subject, that of F. Trevoux on the 
notion of public service, published in the Revue d’Economie Politique in 1938. Industries to supply 
defense production must be included in the field of public service, as in the case of the metallurgical 
industry.  
«The metallurgical industry has thus become a public service as a result of the necessities of national defense in various 
countries.»17  
Citing the case of cast iron production in Britain, Trevoux explains that a Commission has 
recommended a policy of price regulation and ensuring production capacity, following the Report 
of the Import Duties Advisory Committee on the present position and future development of the Iron and Steel 
Industry (July 1937). The sector is therefore under public control to meet the needs of weapons 
production, production is planned and competition, both in the domestic market and abroad, is no 
more the organizing principle of the sector. 
«The characteristic of utilities is thus to be normal and permanently over-equipped and to support significant fixed 
costs, independent of the volume of production. There is thus a real servitude of the public service.»18  
Using the terminology of the Austrian School (Böhm-Bawerk and Hayek), Trevoux explains that 
because of the will to be able to satisfy the demand at any time in the future, «the public service industries 
thus become more and more capitalist and are obliged to plan and build in advance factories and equipment that will 
sometimes come into service after several years ». The result is over-equipment and overcapacity, especially 
« in any aggressive autarchy that always has in view the enormous and sudden needs of war ». 
                                                          
16 . Daudé-Bancel (1935), Le libre-échange, in Journal des Economistes, septembre-octobre article sur le libre-échange 
vers page 443. « C’est sur la question monétaire que le conflit a éclaté entre les partisans de la monnaie dirigée et du 
crédit à bon marché, d’une part, et les partisans de la stabilisation générale et immédiate, d’autre part. C’est l’éternel 
conflit entre les interventionnistes et les tenants de l’économie classique. » 
17 F. Trevoux (1938), « La notion économique de service public », Revue d’Economie Politique, mars-avril, pp. 353-376, 
p. 368. « L’industrie métallurgique est devenue ainsi un service public à la suite des nécessités de la défense nationale 
dans divers pays. » 
18 F. Trevoux (1938), op.cit., p. 369. « La caractéristique des services publics est ainsi d’être de façon normale et 
permanente suréquipés et de supporter des charges fixes importantes, indépendantes du volume de la production. Il y 
a ainsi une véritable servitude du service public. » 
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II – The debate on rearmament as a remedy for the economic crisis 
(Military Keynesianism) 
 
 The European rearmament is concomitant with a growing weight of social spending in the 
British budget, since the outbreak of the crisis of 1929. In Germany, the Nazi regime increases 
military spending on a scale unachievable by democratic regimes, up to nearly 19% of GDP. The 
stimulus effect of these specific public expenditures will reinforce the growing influence of 
Keynesian ideas in Britain and, to a lesser extent, in France.  
 
A) Economists confronted with the German war economy 
 
The successes of German industry have been observed by the European democratic 
countries since the mid-1930s. In 1938 Keynes explains this growth by the fact that the country 
makes full use of its production capacity and he advises Great Britain to refer to this example. He 
is in fact favourable to a flexible state planning19. But even if he rehabilitates interventionism, it 
does not mean that he favors a militarization of economic life. 
A controversy subsequently emerged, with some critics of Keynes accusing him of having fostered 
sympathies for the Nazi regime, advancing the evocation of totalitarianism as a privileged regime 
to apply economic interventionism in the preface to the German edition of the General Theory in 1936. 
Such an argument seems difficult to accept, as Keynes's pacifism and his attachment to democracy 
and individual freedoms are reflected in all his writings. In addition, the precise authorship of this 
preface is subject to caution20. Keynes strongly criticized the national autarchy policies of the 1930s, 
with the development of fascism, Nazism and communism. In his 1933 article on national self-
sufficiency21, he explained that protectionism should be treated with caution; «For I must not be 
supposed to be endorsing all those things which are being done in the political world today in the name of economic 
nationalism. Far from it.» (1933: 244).  
                                                          
19 Series on the State and Industry, 14 March 1932, Volume 21 p 90.   
20 On this point, see Hagemann Harald (2002), The German edition of Keynes’s General Theory: Controversies on the Preface, 
Universität Hohenheim , ESHET conference, May 2013.  
21 Keynes J.M. (1933), "National Self-Sufficiency," The Yale Review, Vol. 22, no. 4 (June 1933), pp. 755-769 
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On the other hand, Markwell recalls that in the mid-1930s Keynes spoke of "brigand powers" 
about Germany, Italy and Japan.22 
 
In the Journal des Economistes of 1936, Edouard Payen presents military expenditures as relatively 
unproductive and as inevitably leading to war, these expenditures not leading to a rise in the 
standard of living for the German population. 
« All economic activity in Germany since the advent of the Hitler regime is artificial and can only lead to a dead end. 
The billions of marks spent have not been spent on productive expenditure in the real economic sense. The factories 
working for the army have been active and the number of unemployed has decreased, but everyday life has not been 
comforted in a healthy way. And the German leaders will one day be forced into a situation that may incite them to 
the worst solutions. There is danger for the world. »23 
 
C) The evolution of Keynes' opinion on the issue of rearmament as a tool for 
boosting British economy 
 
In 1937, Keynes considers that the economic bump justifies a relative budgetary austerity 
(social expenses in particular), while maintaining high military expenses, which will have to be 
preferably financed by the tax.  
«Just as it was advisable for the Government to incur debt during the slump, so for the same reasons it is now 
advisable that they should incline to the opposite policy. Aggregate demand is increased by loan expenditure and 
decreased when loans are discharged out of taxation. In view of the high cost of the armaments, which we cannot 
postpone, it would put too much strain on our fiscal system actually to discharge debt, but the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer should, I suggest, meet the main part of the cost of armaments out of taxation, raising taxes and 
withholding all reliefs for the present as something in hand for 1938 or 1939, or whenever there are signs of recession. 
The boom, not the slump, is the right time for austerity at the Treasury. » 24 
Keynes is therefore in favor of fiscal discipline in the bump period, worried about macroeconomic 
stabilization and especially the fight against inflation. Hayek also hailed in Hayek on Hayek (1994) 
                                                          
22 Markwell (1995), J.M. Keynes, idealism and the economic bases of peace, in Long David, Wilson Peter, “Thinkers of the 
twenty years’ crisis”, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p. 197. 
23 Payen Edouard (1936), Journal des Economistes. « Toute l’activité économique de l’Allemagne depuis l’avènement du régime hitlérien 
est artificielle et ne peut aboutir qu’à une impasse. Les milliards de marks dépensés ne l’ont pas été en dépenses productives au sens vraiment 
économique. Les usines travaillant pour l’armée ont été actives et le nombre des chômeurs a diminué, mais la vie courante n’en a pas été 
réconfortée de façon saine. Et les dirigeants allemands se trouveront un jour acculés à une situation qui pourra les inciter aux pires solutions. 
Là est le danger pour le monde.” 
24 Keynes J.M. (1937), How to avoid a slump 1. The problem of the steady level, The Times, 12-14 January. 
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the fact that the Keynes he knew in Cambridge during the war was anxious not to allow a revival 
of inflation and that they were close on this point, as recalls Nicholas Wapschott25.  
Similarly, Keynes is taking a stand for a relaxation of customs restrictions allowing an increase in 
imports, even if this leads to a deterioration in the balance of payments and consequently to the 
rise in raw material prices and certain production costs, particularly in the arms industry. This 
measure will lead to the export of gold to commodity exporting countries, which will then be able 
to buy British goods later on: 
«The recent decrease in the Bank of England's fiduciary issue indicates that we have today a plethora of gold. It is 
desirable, therefore, that the raw material countries should be allowed to replenish their gold and sterling resources by 
sending their goods to us». 
Armament is not mentioned by Keynes in his planning perspectives, even if he ranks armaments 
in the category of « investment goods », « if they are paid for by borrowing »26. As privileged 
investment goods of a planning, he targets civil sectors: 
«Building and transport and public utilities, which can use large amounts of capital, lie half way 
between private and public control. They need, therefore, the combined stimulus of public policy and a low rate of 
interest.»27 
 
The relatively low level of arms expenditure relative to other public expenditure in Great Britain, 
and particularly that of "social services", is also recalled by Etienne Mantoux in the Revue 
d'Economie Politique in 1939. The rise in state expenditure in the national income (6% in 1870 
against 18% in 1937) « is explained, as in France, by the charges of the public debt (...) and more recently by 
the expenditure of armaments. But the permanent element of increased public spending has been the development of 
social services. »28  
In 1937, Keynes rejected the hypothesis of a revival of productive activity (likely to provoke 
inflationary pressures) by the increase in military expenditure induced by rearmament. These 
expenses are too low to have a significant effect: 
                                                          
25 Wapshott, Nicholas (2011), Keynes Hayek: The Clash that Defined Modern Economics W. W. Norton & Company, NY, 
London, p. 192. 
26 Keynes (1937), op.cit, p. 386. 
27 Keynes (1937), op.cit., p 394 
28 Etienne Mantoux (1939),  Revue d’Economie Politique, janvier-février, page 574. 
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« The cost of rearmament is neither permanent nor large enough while it lasts to sustain prosperity by itself (in 1936 
at least seven or eight times as much was spent on new building as on rearmament).»29 
 
But in 1939, in a radio interview transcribed in The Listener, titled Will rearmament cure 
unemployment?, Keynes asserts the possible effectiveness against unemployment of military 
expenditure30. It must be said that the British military budget has increased considerably since 1937, 
probably leading to greater economic impact. The stimulation of economic activities linked to arms 
production should lead to an increase in employment and wages, which could lead to an increase 
in demand and hence in production. Assuming a 150 million pounds increase in military spending, 
Keynes concluded that this could help overcome unemployment, because of their multiplier effect:  
« If so, the direct effect of the armament expenditure may be to take 300,000 men of the dole. I fancy that even the 
pessimists would reckon that a fairly conservative figure. »31 
 However, the increase in armaments production is only a second-best solution, which does not 
meet social needs and which will slow down the productive potential of the economy in the long 
term. Military expenditures are the most unproductive (but useful for national defence) of public 
expenditures. Weapons are either stocked or destroyed in the event of war; therefore their 
production does not represent an intertemporal transfer of purchasing power, but a definitive 
exclusion of the factors of production from the economic process. It is unproductive consumption. 
Preparation for war, more than the war itself, is a temporary incentive for economic activity. But 
Keynes disapproved of what is now known as ‘military Keynesianism’, because it could only have 
short-term effects. It is better to direct public investment towards the building sector or civil 
engineering, which are socially useful. 
« I have a special extra reason for hoping that trade-unionists will do what they can to make this big transition 
to fuller employment work smoothly. I began by saying that the grand experiment has begun. If it works, if 
expenditure on armament really cure unemployment, I predict that we shall never go back all the way to the old 
state of affairs. I we can cure unemployment for the wasted purpose of armaments, we can cure it for the productive 
purposes of peace.»32 
In fact, Keynes regrets that the only public expenditure of his time that helps to absorb 
unemployment is made in the military sector. Without the military spending, the British 
                                                          
29 Keynes J.M. (1937), How to avoid a slump 1. The problem of the steady level, The Times, 12-14 January, p. 392 
x30 ‘Will Rearmament Cure Unemployment?’, The Listener, 1st June 1939, 528-532. 
31 Op.cit., 531. 
32 Op.cit. 532. 
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government would never have issued public loans. However, military expenditure’s effectiveness 
in overcoming the economic crisis can only be temporary. A policy based on other public spending 
would be more effective. 
Moreover, in 1942, in his analysis on the European economies after the Second World War, Keynes 
highlighted the lack of productivity of military spending and the burden it represents on the 
national economy, while public finances should be used to encourage national productive 
capacities. He denounced Germany's ban on keeping an army and an armaments industry, saying 
that these measures were a means of ridding the country of a considerable economic burden33. The 
growth of German exports, at the expense of other countries, such as Great Britain, bearing the 
burden of international security, will be inevitable. Keynes suggests that, in compensation, 
Germany contributes to the financing of peacekeeping in the world. 
 
D) A slow diffusion of Keynesian ideas in France in the late 1930s 
 
 In France, fiscal austerity limits rearmament, especially as pacifism permeates the thought of 
Leon Blum. It is therefore logical that the impact of the rearmament or nationalization of war 
material factories should not be subjects of study for economists after 1936. The question of State 
intervention is a growing field of study for French economists. In economic journals, the second 
half of the 1930s saw the main themes of economists’ debates moving from monetary issues (the 
fight against inflation being central) to those of interventionism and planning34. Although the 
French translation of the General Theory was not completed until 1942, Keynes's ideas spread as 
soon as 1936 in France, thanks to certain economists. Thus, in an article of the Revue d'Economie 
Politique of 1936 entitled The scientific work of some foreign economists. J.M. Keynes35, J.M. Jeanneney 
presents the main points of Keynesian theory, expressing in passing his skepticism about the 
monetary analyzes of the British economist, described as ‘utopian’. He concludes that while it is 
likely that Keynes's ideas will fizzle out, he nevertheless has the merit of changing economic 
thinking, making many people aware of the possibilities open to decision-makers to influence the 
economic conditions, thanks to an active economic policy.  
                                                          
33 Inter-Departemental Committee on Reparation and Economic Security, 21 December 1942, Volume 26 p 339. 
34 This is particularly visible in the themes of the articles of the Revue d'Economie Politique and the Journal des Economistes, 
from 1936 to 1940.  
35 Jeanneney J.M. (1936), « L’œuvre scientifique de quelques économistes étrangers. J.M. Keynes », in Revue d’Economie 
Politique, Janvier-Février. 
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« The merit of his teaching has been to inspire a great faith in the sovereignty of thought, in the power it has to better 
organize the economic world. From now on, in all countries, even in Great Britain, isn’t it realized what Keynes had 
predicted and desired for a long time : the end of laissez-faire? »36 
 
 In his 1937 article, Keynes indeed salutes the fact that attitudes have definitely changed in 
economic affairs: the time of laissez-faire and the belief in an ‘invisible hand’ has passed, there is 
now an awareness of the need of a real economic policy, using monetary policy measures to change 
interest rates, as well as taxes and public spending. 
« We have entirely freed ourselves-this applies to every party and every quarter-from the philosophy of the laissez-faire 
state. We have new means at our disposal which we intend to use. Perhaps we know more. But chiefly it is a general 
conviction that the stability of our institutions absolutely requires a resolute attempt to apply what perhaps we know 
to preventing the recurrence of another steep descent.»37 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The European arms race from the mid-1930s did not take place at the same pace and in the 
same way in all countries. The examples of France and Great Britain are thus very different. In 
France, the liberal theory is still largely dominant and budgetary austerity initially limits the increase 
in military spending. When defense budgets are increased from 1937, the production of weapons 
keeps low yields, what some economists attribute to the nationalization of October 1936. But in 
general, the debate remains very weak on this issue among French economists. In Britain, on the 
other hand, the impact of the rise in public spending on the national economy is a hot topic, mainly 
thanks to the diffusion of the ideas of the General Theory of J.M. Keynes. In some writings of the 
mid-1930s, the prolific economist tends to mitigate the impact of rearmament on economic 
growth, at least until 1939. Behind the issue of rearmament appears the gradual shift in economists' 
concerns, from the fight against inflation to a reflection on planning and the state support to 
economic growth. 
                                                          
36 Jeanneney J.M. (1936), op.cit. « Le mérite de son enseignement aura été d’inspirer une grande foi dans la souveraineté de la pensée, 
dans le pouvoir qu’elle a de mieux organiser le monde économique. Dès maintenant, en tous pays, en Grande-Bretagne même, ce que Keynes 
avait prédit et souhaité de longue date ne se réalise-t-il pas : la fin du laissez-faire ? »  
37 Keynes (1937), op.cit., p. 384  
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